Yarkoni's analysis clearly articulates a number of concerns limiting the generalizability and explanatory power of psychological findings, many of which are compounded in infancy research. ManyBabies addresses these concerns via a radically collaborative, large-scale and open approach to research that is grounded in theory-building, committed to diversification, and focused on understanding sources of variation.

Le livre de J. Moreau est un exposé général de la philosophie aristotélicienne.

RésuméDans cette réponse à mes commentateurs, je réagis aux critiques de Alysia Blackham, Jessica Eisen, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Dale Smith, Iyiola Solanke, et Daniel Viehoff incluses dans ce numéro spécial consacré à mon livre, Faces of Inequality. Parmi les sujets abordés, j'analyse les liens entre l’égalité et la discrimination, le rôle que joue la subordination dans ma théorie de la discrimination, et la méthodologie dans les théories de la discrimination.

Constans, who defends the unanimous reading of the manuscripts, explains ‘tertium’ as a reference to two previous senatus consulta which Fufius did not veto . The problem with this interpretation is that Fufius is not even mentioned in the passage Constans cites; in fact, this letter marks Fufius' first appearance in the correspondence. On the basis of what is preserved it is difficult to see how Atticus could have divined such a meaning in Cicero's ‘tertium’. Scholars have preferred to emend. (...) The proposals of Graevius and Manutius have been criticized by Shackleton Bailey on the grounds that ‘concessit’ cannot mean ‘non intercessit’ in the absence of any mention of previous intercessory action on Fufius' part. However, in view of Cicero's description of the tribune in ad Att. 1.14.1, Atticus would have been no less puzzled if Fufius' failure to veto went unexplained. No earlier allusion to Fufius is necessary. Both ‘territus’ and ‘tum’ provide an explanatory context for Fufius' behaviour which makes the word play in ‘concessit’ understandable and perfectly acceptable. Shackleton Bailey's own suggestion does not suit the context of the letter, as Ph. Moreau demonstrates in some detail. In addition to the arguments adduced by Moreau, it is important to notice that Shackleton Bailey's reading fails to conform to the confident and victorious mood of the letter or to the plot of the relevant paragraph : once Cato's intrusion has focused the resentment of the Senate against Clodius' supporters and his tactics, Cicero depicts Clodhis 'position as increasingly abject. (shrink)

Moreau sketches here with enthusiasm the large features of Aquinas’s epistemology. He is not, as he makes clear, a Thomist either by training or by avowal. The book is not, then, a specialist’s monograph or dogmatic treatise. It is Moreau’s attempt to hear what Aquinas will say to the great questions. The attempt is largely successful in attending to Aquinas’s remarks, though it does not catch their ambiguities.

RésuméLe livre ambitieux et nuancé de Sophia Moreau défend une vision pluraliste de la discrimination injuste. Je soutiens trois points. Premièrement, je soutiens que le compte rendu de Moreau sur la liberté délibérative ne fournit pas de motif distinct pour s'opposer à la discrimination. Deuxièmement, je soutiens qu'il n'y a pas, entre sa vision et l'expressivisme, un écart aussi important qu'elle le suggère. Troisièmement, j'avance qu'une lacune intrigante dans l'argument mérite une exploration plus poussée : Moreau ne (...) nous fournit jamais de description détaillée des situations où la subordination sociale est immorale ni des raisons qui expliquent pourquoi elle le devient. (shrink)

RésuméLe monisme et le pluralisme ne sont pas seulement utilisés pour décrire la manière dont le droit international s'intègre dans un système juridique national ; ils peuvent également s'appliquer aux études qui cherchent à expliquer le « désordre » de la discrimination. Selon la théorie pluraliste de Sophia Moreau, le caractère répréhensible de la discrimination peut être résumé par trois types de traitement : la subordination, la restriction et l'exclusion. Dans cet article, j'explorerai le rôle que joue le pouvoir (...) dans sa théorie — alors que la question du pouvoir est explicitement discutée en relation avec la subordination, elle est moins apparente en ce qui concerne la restriction et l'exclusion. Cependant, je soutiens que le pouvoir est un élément crucial qui sous-tend toutes les formes de discrimination et tous les motifs de discrimination. (shrink)

The recently published Cambridge Companion to Spinoza contains a fine essay by Pierre- Francois Moreau on Spinoza’s reception and on his influence during the more than three hundred years that have passed since his death. In Moreau’s twenty-five page article we find a brief paragraph on the novelist George Eliot and half a sentence on Ed Curley. There is not another mention, at all, of any other philosopher from an English-speaking land since the seventeenth century – nothing on how (...) Spinoza’s ideas were received in England, North America or Australia. Not a word on any influence that Spinoza might have had on later thinkers in those countries. (shrink)

La publication de l'Emile a produit une rupture épistémologique qui n'a pas échappé à Kant. Mais, rejetant toute assomption philosophique, l'ouvrage de 1762 met en récit une méthode qui prétend accomplir l'homme en ce qu'il est, tout en même temps qu'en ce qu'il doit être. Consacrant le pouvoir d'autoformation du sujet, Rousseau ouvre pourtant, à son corps défendant, une nouvelle brèche philosophique dans le rapport que ce sujet triomphant entretient avec ce que le Genevois s'obstine à présenter comme " la (...) bonté absolue du projet ". C'est à penser cette brèche, et le chemin pour la franchir, que se consacreront un certain nombre de penseurs et acteurs pédagogiques, qui peuvent ainsi s'inscrire dans la postérité éducative de l'Emile, et que présentent des spécialistes de chacun d'entre eux : Condorcet (A. Trouvé), Kant (B. Vandewalle), Pestalozzi (M. Soëtard), Fichte (J: M. Lamarre), Herbart (J: F. Goubet), Dilthey (D. Moreau), Dewey (M. Fabre), Freinet (R. Hétier). Ont-ils réussi? Il se pourrait que l'Emile, avec le noeud de questions qu'il tisse, soit encore devant nous. (shrink)

RésuméDans Faces of Inequality, Sophia Moreau propose une théorie pluraliste de la manière dont la discrimination cause du tort aux individus. J'approche les idées de Moreau non pas en tant que philosophe ou théoricienne du droit, mais plutôt comme sociologue du droit à l’égalité et spécialiste empirique. Mon commentaire aborde cinq provocations ressortant du travail de Moreau, qui ont trait aux accommodements raisonnables, au rôle de la comparaison dans le traitement juridique de l’égalité, à la distinction public/privé, (...) à la justification de la discrimination et à la discrimination en tant que tort personnel. Alors que le travail de Moreau est fondé sur les thèmes communs ou les caractéristiques partagées qui émergent des lois sur l’égalité de différentes juridictions, je l'examine en relation avec l'exceptionnalité, en m'appuyant sur les développements uniques relatifs à la discrimination sur l’âge dans certaines juridictions australiennes, et sur notre expérience avec la caractéristique protégée « exceptionnelle » qu'est l’âge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 123-124 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Textes philosophiques: conclusions philosophiques. Dissertation en deux parties sur la vision des vérités en Dieu et l'amour de la vertu. Régle du bon sens. De la liberté de l'homme Antoine Arnauld. Textes philosophiques: conclusions philosophiques. Dissertation en deux parties sur la vision des vérités en Dieu et l'amour de la vertu. Régle du bon (...) sens. De la liberté de l'homme. Épiméthée. Translated by Denis Moreau. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001. Pp. xi + 333. Cloth, FF 198.00. This collection should prove useful to anyone doing research on Antoine Arnauld, or more generally on philosophical theology in seventeenth-century France. The collection contains excellent French translations of three Latin texts, and a scholarly, if not critical, edition of a fourth text that appeared originally in French. They are accompanied by helpful [End Page 123] introductions and copious scholarly notes. A bibliography of 533 secondary works on Arnauld is provided.Studies of Arnauld's philosophy have concentrated on his polemics with Malebranche and Leibniz. Moreau suggests that Arnauld's philosophy is worth studying in its own right, and the texts he has selected provide a start for such a study. The first text, Conclusiones Philosophicae, is a set of theses composed by Arnauld for defense by one of his students in 1641, when Arnauld himself was twenty-nine years old. It is our only record of Arnauld's early philosophical thought. Moreau points out that Conclusiones anticipates themes developed by Arnauld during the rest of his long career, and that the text is also valuable as an indicator of the sort of philosophical questions being discussed in Paris at the time that Descartes wrote the Meditations. The original Latin and Moreau's French translation are given on facing pages.The second and third texts in the collection, Dissertatio Bipartita and Régles du Bon Sens, were parts of a debate within Jansenist circles near the end of Arnauld's life. Arnauld's friend, and his collaborator in the Port-Royal Logic, Pierre Nicole, had introduced into Port-Royal the speculation that every human being receives a "grace générale" that makes it possible for her to perform morally good actions. Arnauld attacked this theory in the late 1680s. Given the Augustinian assumption that an action is morally good only if it is directed to God as the agent's final end, and given that some people have never thought about God, the theory of a grace générale raised a philosophical question: How could someone who has no knowledge of God act out of the love of God? Nicole's answer was that the grace générale given to every human being brings with it a sort of implicit, confused, and imperceptible knowledge and love of God. In defense of this answer, Nicole refers to a thesis written by the Louvain theologian Gommaire Huygens, also a friend of Arnauld's, and defended by one of Huygens's students in 1688. Huygens says that anyone who has knowledge of a necessary and immutable truth sees that truth "in the first and uncreated truth, which is God," and that anyone who loves chastity or any other moral virtue, by that very fact loves "the eternal reason of chastity, which is in God." These positions seemed to support the notion that everyone might have an implicit knowledge and love of God even if some have never consciously thought about God. Arnauld attacked these claims in 1692 in his Latin Dissertatio bipartita, of which Moreau provides a French translation. Nicole was impressed and disturbed by the Dissertatio, confessing that he did not know how to respond. He asked another mutual friend of his and Arnauld's, the Benedictine François Lamy, to answer Arnauld. In reply to Lamy, Arnauld wrote... (shrink)

Plotinus’ thought is generally viewed as a “system”, the One’s system, wich embraces and considers the Totality as such, as a whole, ruled by the metaphysical law of the unity. Scholars as É. Bréhier, J. Moreau, G. Reale, J. Igal, A. H. Armstrong... agree to it. The present study tries to make explicit and interpret it, examining some basic features, or general traits, wich reveal the Plotinian doctrine from this same point of view. Therefore, the systematic side of Plotinus’ (...) thought is here viewed as the really suitable mode, way or “mothodology” to think the Totality as a supreme unity, and to express the One’s ontology as a perfect whole. According to this interpretation, the system reflects the “synoptical” view of its same content, and shows it as the One’s “presence” in the whole reality and in the Plotinus’ intuitive mind, developed through an ordered series of concepts, in view of the mystical experience, to the union with the One, as the final goal. (shrink)

El pensamiento de Plotino es interpretado, por lo general, como un sistema", el sistema del Uno, que abarca y considera la Totalidad como un conjunto regido por la ley metafísica de la unidad. Estudiosos como É. Bréhier, J. Moreau, G. Reale, J. Igal, A. H. Armstrong... convienen en esto. El presente estudio intenta explicitarlo e interpretarlo examinando algunas características básicas o notas generales que manifiestan la doctrina plotiniana bajo este mismo punto de vista. En consecuencia, el carácter sistemático del (...) pensamiento de Plotino es entendido aquí como la "metodología" apropiada para pensar la Totalidad como suprema unidad y para expresar la ontología del Uno como un todo perfecto. Según esta interpretación, el sistema refleja la visión "sinóptica" de su contenido mismo y la muestra como la presencia misma del Uno en la realidad conjunta y en la mente intuitiva de Plotino, desplegada mediante una serie ordenada de conceptos, orientada a la experiencia mística, para la unión con el Uno como meta final. (shrink)

Plotinus’ thought is generally viewed as a “system”, the One’s system, wich embraces and considers the Totality as such, as a whole, ruled by the metaphysical law of the unity. Scholars as É. Bréhier, J. Moreau, G. Reale, J. Igal, A. H. Armstrong... agree to it. The present study tries to make explicit and interpret it, examining some basic features, or general traits, wich reveal the Plotinian doctrine from this same point of view. Therefore, the systematic side of Plotinus’ (...) thought is here viewed as the really suitable mode, way or “mothodology” to think the Totality as a supreme unity, and to express the One’s ontology as a perfect whole. According to this interpretation, the system reflects the “synoptical” view of its same content, and shows it as the One’s “presence” in the whole reality and in the Plotinus’ intuitive mind, developed through an ordered series of concepts, in view of the mystical experience, to the union with the One, as the final goal. (shrink)

Plotinus’ thought is generally viewed as a “system”, the One’s system, wich embraces and considers the Totality as such, as a whole, ruled by the metaphysical law of the unity. Scholars as É. Bréhier, J. Moreau, G. Reale, J. Igal, A. H. Armstrong... agree to it. The present study tries to make explicit and interpret it, examining some basic features, or general traits, wich reveal the Plotinian doctrine from this same point of view. Therefore, the systematic side of Plotinus’ (...) thought is here viewed as the really suitable mode, way or “mothodology” to think the Totality as a supreme unity, and to express the One’s ontology as a perfect whole. According to this interpretation, the system reflects the “synoptical” view of its same content, and shows it as the One’s “presence” in the whole reality and in the Plotinus’ intuitive mind, developed through an ordered series of concepts, in view of the mystical experience, to the union with the One, as the final goal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 559-560 [Access article in PDF] Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer, editors. The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. Pp. vi + 179. Cloth, $60.00. What can be added to classical defenses of the problem of evil? Did Voltairenotrelieve us from taking seriously the theodicies of early modern thinkers in Candide when Pangloss (...) avers that spectacles exist because noses were made to support them? Do we not rightfully regard Malebranche's ingenious appeal to God's simplicity and uniformity to explain malformed offspring as little more than a curiosity? Yet, the editors of this volume claim that the "theodicy problem was no mere idle puzzle of dogmatics, but a problem of immense social significance, a problem which cut to the heart of the philosophical and theological projects of the very best minds of the age" (5). Several essays in this volume bear out the editors' claim, and to a modern reader, show how the problem of evil was intricately woven into the philosophical ideas of early modern thought.The problem of evil is especially acute for many of the seventeenth-century authors surveyed in this volume who held that God is the total and efficient cause of the universe. God's constant involvement in physical events meant that defects, deformities, and natural disasters fell into the framework of the traditional problem of evil. Hence, physical evil became the preoccupation of natural philosophers and theologians alike. We learn that Leibniz, Malebranche, and Spinoza chose to limit God's will rather than His wisdom, whereas Descartes opted to limit God's wisdom. The odd man out is Bayle who crafted a third position that emphasized God's benevolence at the expense of His wisdom and will.The essays found in this volume are just a sampling of views in the period, but it is more than a good start. Freddoso's essay on Francisco Suarez sets the tone for the problem of explaining the causal origin of human evil. Freddoso shows how Suarez distinguished concurrent from original causes in order to credit God for His supreme causal role yet absolved Him of blame for the existence of moral defectiveness. Latzer, in his essay on Rene Descartes, perhaps overstates the case in attributing to Descartes a theodicy grander than that of Leibniz, but he draws on the Fourth Meditation account of error to provide a plausible and nuanced reconstruction of his views on evil.There are two essays on Baruch Spinoza. Hunter's essay lays out an argument for Spinoza as a radical Christian reformer touching on Spinoza's views on providence. Nadler notes in his essay that Spinoza ought to have rejected the whole question of theodicy as incoherent, but shows how the matter is a good deal more complicated. Nadler then introduces us to the Medieval Jewish tradition, from which Spinoza is said to have drawn his views leading to a denial of personal immortality. [End Page 559]Moreau's essay on Nicholas Malebranche is rich in historical context and philosophical interpretation. Malebranche is shown to be a critical and original thinker on the problem of evil. Moreau lauds Malebranche's philosophical and moral courage in his bold assertion that physical evil is not a negation but rather a real phenomenon requiring explanation.Larivière and Lennon argue that Bayle held a third position rarely seen in the period: that God's benevolence trumps considerations of both His wisdom and will. Bayle develops a "moral solution" to the problem of evil wherein God's benevolence requires that humans possess an autonomy of conscience whose exercise makes error and heresy morally possible and justifiable.The final three essays in the volume rightly focus on aspects of Leibniz's response to the problem of evil. Kremer shows how, in the case of Leibniz's treatment of the fate of infants who die unbaptized, Leibniz abandons the Augustinian approach to the problem of evil and calculates the fate of all creatures on the basis of what produces... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Deux cartésiens: La polémique Arnauld MalebrancheSteven NadlerDenis Moreau. Deux cartésiens: La polémique Arnauld Malebranche. Paris: J. Vrin, 1999. Pp. 353. NP.The Arnauld-Malebranche debate is one of the great intellectual events of the seventeenth-century. Taking place over an eleven-year time span, and brought to a conclusion only by Arnauld's death, the debate ranged over a wide variety of philosophical and theological issues. At stake were some of the (...) most important questions faced by early modern thinkers: the nature of human knowledge and its relationship to the divine understanding; the appropriate conception of human and divine freedom; the problem of causality; the ontology of evil and the possibility of engaging in theodicean speculation; even the nature of God itself. It is thus very surprising that there has not been, until now, a full-scale (but by no means exhaustive) study of the debate, especially its rich philosophical dimensions.Many readers approaching the documents of the affaire are, of course, put off by the unpleasant personal invective that characterizes many of the principals' exchanges, as well as by what appears to be the repetitive nature of much of the dialogue. Philosophers, as well, have probably been deterred by the debate's theological dimensions, especially the wrangling over questions of grace. More importantly, contemporary philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have been led to believe that the philosophical side of the debate is fairly one-dimensional, centered only on the nature of representational ideas and the problems surrounding our perception of the external [End Page 595] world. In fact, as Denis Moreau shows in this learned, highly-readable and illuminating study of the debate, the controversy over ideas was only the opening round, Arnauld's point of entry into Malebranche's complex, systematic, but (to Arnauld's mind) highly objectionable philosophical theology.The title of this book is important. Part of Moreau's thesis is that much of the passion of the debate, especially on Arnauld's side, has its origin in the familial context. What is at stake, at least in Arnauld's mind, is the legacy of Cartesianism. Arnauld, Moreau argues convincingly (and contrary to a good deal of scholarly opinion), was a sincere and committed (but not uncritical) disciple of Descartes' (177). His attack on Malebranche was motivated, in part, by a desire to prevent "la philosophie cartésienne" from being transformed for posterity into "la philosophie malebranchiste." It was also motivated, of course and perhaps more importantly, by his desire to defend what he took to be the true Christian conception of God.Part One of the book is devoted to showing how Arnauld's polemical persistence was the result not just of a pugnacious character or personal animus towards his opponent, but rather of a principled approach to philosophical inquiry. His beliefs on the nature and validity of evidence, the proper method to be used in the search after truth, and especially philosophy as a social enterprise all demanded a personal and dialectical confrontation with a heavy dose of rhetoric. Malebranche, on the other hand, preferred a more solitary and meditative mode of inquiry, and was thus unprepared for Arnauld's agonistic onslaught. Thus, Moreau insists with great originality, "on peut ainsi lire cette polémique comme le conflit de deux théories de l'acquisition et de la constitution du savoir."The occasional cause of Arnauld's attack on Malebranche's theory of ideas and his doctrine of vision in God (in Des vraies et des fausses idées) was the publication of the Traité de la nature et de la grace (1680). The epistemological and ontological objections raised in the initial discussion over "êtres représentatifs" was meant ultimately to undermine Malebranche's theodicy by attacking the foundational principles upon which it rested. In Part Two of the book, Moreau looks at what, in Arnauld's eyes, was the essential flow in Malebranche's account: the assertion of the reality of evil. Evil, Malebranche insisted, was not to be explained away as merely illusory, or as forming an essential contributing ingredient of a larger, more perfect whole. Evil is irreducibly real; there is imperfection... (shrink)